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ABSTRACT 
This study examines the relationship between formal business education, business experience 
as CEO characteristics and MFIs performance. It uses a global dataset of 403 rated MFIs 
located in 74 countries for the period of 2001 to 2009. This study uses random effects panel 
data estimations to analyses the effect of CEO with formal business education and business 
experience on return on assets, portfolio at risk of 30 days, which measures financial 
performance, and average loan size, percentage of women clients and number of credit 
clients, which capture, outreach performance. The results show that MFIs with CEO with 
business experience have better return on assets, few loan defaults, smaller loan size, higher 
percentage of women clients and associated with credit clients’ increase compared to MFIs 
with CEO without business experience. While MFIs with CEO with formal business 
education have a higher percentage of women clients, credit clients’ growth and smaller loan 
size compared to MFIs with CEO without formal business education, the study find no 
difference in performance on return on assets and portfolio at risk for 30 days. These findings 
suggest that, in the future, the microfinance industry can benefit from non-microfinance 
industry CEO with business experience. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses the background study of CEOs characteristics influence in MFIs 
performance, statement of the research problem, objective, research question, contribution of 
the study and organisation of the study.  
1.1 Background of the study 
Microfinance institutions (MFIs) are organisations that offer banking services to poor people, 
who are economically in desperate need of a small amount of loan to finance for, example, 
their business, educations, manage emergencies, obtain assets, or smooth consumption (Di 
Bella, 2011).  
Existing Chief executive officers (CEO) and MFI performance literatures focuses on 
the role of CEO gender and MFI performance (e.g. Strøm. et al., working paper, Mersland 
and Strøm, 2009b), impact of duality of CEO and MFI performance (e.g. Galema et al., 2012) 
and, the role of founder CEO and MFI performance (e.g. Mersland. et al., 2011). There are 
few empirical findings related to CEO characteristics, or top management team demographic 
profile influences and MFI performance (Sow Hup, 2010). This study responds into filling 
this gap by investigating the influence of CEO characteristics on MFI performance, in 
particular, with the focus on CEO formal business education and business experience. The 
influence of CEO in any firm cannot be ignores because;  
“CEOs control the management staff of a firm and acts as the liaison between company 
employees and the Board of Directors. CEOs are responsible for planning and implementing 
the strategy of a firm and are accountable for the success or failure of a firm through the 
Board of Directors and shareholders” (Martelli and Abels, 2011pp.19). 
The CEOs have potential impact to influence performance in MFIs if she/he has 
leadership quality, management quality and development quality (Midgal et al., 2006) 
provided there is strong board of directors and strong senior management (Galema et al., 
2012, Mori and Mersland, 2011, Hudon, 2010). Particularly, they steer efficient productivity, 
performance and development of staff within the MFI and are responsible for maintaining 
sound financial solvency by having the ability to mobilize financial resource (Ruth Jacobs et 
al., 2007).   
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The empirical research on CEO characteristics
1
 and MFI performance is few and limited; 
hence this study uses empirical findings from international business corporations for better 
understand the role of CEO characteristics in MFI performance and managerial implications 
thereof (Mersland et al., 2011). Both microfinance and international business research on 
corporations show that, in general, characteristic of CEO is indispensable in any 
organisations (Martelli and Abels, 2010, Martelli and Abels, 2011, Gwin, 2011, Mersland and 
Strøm, 2009b, Chan, 2010). Among the characteristics of the CEO which have empirical 
evidence in international business corporations, includes formal business education and 
business experience, of which shows, to have influence in firm performance (Gottesman and 
Morey, 2010, Bhagat et al., 2010a, Soriano and Castrogiovanni, 2012, Guthrie and Datta, 
1997). This implies that MFIs can benefit from formal business education and business 
experience of CEOs as the business corporations does. By studying the influence of CEOs 
formal business education and CEOs business experience on MFIs performance, decision 
makers can have a better understanding of whether the existing labor force of CEOs has 
influence in MFIs performance and if CEOs with business experience from non-microfinance 
can be employed in MFIs successful and drive MFIs performance.  
1.2 Statement of the research problem 
In MFIs, lack of professionalism and technical expertise at senior management level creates 
poor internal controls environment and poor implementation and formulation of strategies, 
particularly being lack of senior management level with experience and coupled with finance 
and banking (Lascelles, 2011). Therefore, these impediments to the microfinance industry 
need to be addressed empirically from different scenes for future prospect of the industry and 
the people it serves. Considering the role of CEO in MFI, it is the purpose of this study to 
examine the way CEO formal business education and business experience overcome these 
impediments and contributes into MFIs performance. 
1.3 Research objective 
To analyse the relationship between formal business education, business experience as CEOs 
characteristics and MFIs performance  
                                                 
1
 Formal business education and business experience 
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1.4 Research question 
Do the MFIs with CEO with formal business education and business experience have better 
performance compared with MFIs with CEO without formal business education and business 
experience? 
1.5 Contribution of the study 
Using Resource Based Theory and Upper echelons theory, this study provides a better 
understanding of the management succession in MFIs. This study adds literature to the 
international business management and strategy of MFI by linking the management; 
governance of MFIs and, the importance of training, human capital investments and CEOs 
labour market (Deresky, 2011, Thomsen, 2008, Garibaldi, 2006).  
1.6 Organisation of the study 
This study organised as follows. There are six chapters. Microfinance global industry and 
CEO labor markets covered in chapter two.  Theoretical background, conceptual framework 
and hypotheses, covered in chapter three. Chapter four cover the methodology of the study 
and chapter five cover the findings and data analysis. Chapter six cover discussion, 
conclusion, theoretical, policy and managerial implications, areas for future studies and 
limitations of the study.   
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CHAPTER TWO: MICROFINANCE INDUSTRY AND CEOs LABOR MARKET  
This chapter provides overview of the global microfinance industry and CEOs labor market 
in MFIs.  
2.1 Global Microfinance industry 
Microfinance refers to the provision of small loan and other related financial services like 
savings, money transfer services and microinsurance to poor people and microenterprises 
(Karlan and Goldberg, 2011, Mersland, 2009b). The microfinance industry became popular 
when the founder of Grameen bank Muhammad Yunus and the Grameen bank received a 
2
Nobel Peace Prize in 2006 recognizing the effort in creating economic and social 
opportunities for the poor people through lending small amount of money (Tharoor, 2006). 
From his book, (Yunus, 1999) it took him relentless effort to pioneer the idea of microfinance 
as a mean to fight poverty hence be recognised by the policy maker within the government. 
He was the founder and CEO of the Grameen bank; hence it made him more popular for the 
success.  
In general, microfinance remain the only way to reach the poor, for example, 
according to (Lascelles et al., 2011) the microfinance industry is currently serving 150 
million clients worldwide, of which is approximately 6% of the 2.7 billion people who still 
cannot afford the formal, traditional banking system. The aggressiveness of the microfinance 
industry to reach the 2.7 billion clients posit higher competition among MFIs (Lascelles et al., 
2011). This intense competition is a result of readily available capital for MFIs to expand 
their services, the entry of commercial banks, which vested with knowing the end customers 
due to being in the financial industry and the leverage they have due to well established 
technology in the banking industry, (Lascelles et al., 2011).     
2.2 CEOs labor market 
The labor market force for CEOs in MFIs is not bulky. This is because, like in for profit only 
business corporations one may expect the external market force to play a role in reshaping the 
microfinance industry to have well qualified CEOs. This is not the case in MFIs, because, in 
for profit only business Corporations, the market force for CEOs characterised, for example, 
by takeover and mergers. In MFIs, the scenario is different. These forces have limited role 
because of different ownership of MFIs; hence, most MFs has no true owners (Hartarska, 
2005, Mersland and Strøm, 2010). This has led into having weak governance in MFIs 
                                                 
2
 http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2006/ 
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characterised by poor management quality and staffing due to having  insufficient qualified, 
resourceful and knowledgeable personnel (Lascelles et al., 2011, Mersland, 2009c).  
Is CEOs in microfinance important? This is a serious and fascinating question for one 
reason: That is; shareholders, donors and prospective investors in MFIs are in constant search 
of capable and competent CEOs who can run the MFI profitably and reach more poor clients. 
Particularly the focuses of MFIs on social achievement and financial sustainability are of 
considerable concerns especially to stakeholders. Also, great concerns by the public at 
general is that of reaching poorer clients strata especially women customers who has 
empirically shown to have fewer loans defaults (for example see D’Espallier et al., 2011). 
Another concern is that of remaining financially sustainable or commercially viable in the 
perspective of donors and shareholders of the MFIs so that they can earn the return and 
continue to serve the poor (e.g. Hermes and Lensink, 2011, Hermes et al., 2011). Also, the 
data for business education and business experience of CEOs are one of the publicly 
available, which make possible for this study to investigate the influence of these 
characteristics on MFIs performance.  
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CHAPTER THREE: THEORIES AND RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
This chapter discusses the empirical evidence from past research on CEOs formal business 
education, business experience and firm performance. It draws literature from both 
microfinance and international business research in order for better understanding the 
influence of CEOs formal business education and business experience on MFIs performance. 
The empirical evidence if followed by discussion of theoretical background of resource based 
view theory and upper echelon theory. The conceptual framework covers the last section of 
this chapter.  
3.1 Overview of empirical evidence from past research  
Education and Experience of CEOs are one of the criteria that considered when hiring a CEO 
(Mackey, 2008, Gwin, 2011, Magnusson and Boggs, 2006, Sow Hup, 2010). The focus is on 
whether such attribute has an impact on firm performance. To study CEO experience and 
firm performance (Guthrie and Datta, 1997) studied a sample of 214 CEO. Their results 
indicate that experience of CEO has a positive relationship with firm performance. Another 
study by (Soriano and Castrogiovanni, 2012) who studied sample of 2,713 SMEs within 
European Union, they found that CEO experience has a positive influence on firm 
productivity but not profitability. The productivity measured based on revenue per employee.  
Using a sample of 393 CEOs (Slater and Dixon-Fowler, 2009) CEOs international 
assignment experience positively related to the corporate social performance. Also, (Daily et 
al., 2000) studied sample of CEOs from fortune 500 on the influence of CEO international 
experience on firm performance. They found that there is a strong, positive relationship 
between CEO experience and firm performance.  
The owners or founders of firms considered to have experience in managing their 
business. Empirical evidence by (Mersland. et al., 2011) who studied the impact of CEO 
founders in microbanks using 286 microbanks in73 developing countries for the period of 10 
years. Their main argument for their study was that founder CEO has tremendous interest of 
ownership in the firm; hence they are better manager and have competencies. This is in 
support with the finding by (Soriano and Castrogiovanni, 2012) where they found that CEO-
owner firm has better management hence they have better performance. In their finding, they 
concluded that microbanks managed by founder CEOs have better management. That is they 
exhibit higher growth, fewer loans defaults (PaR30) and lower cost of operation.  
The study by (Laveren et al., 2011) investigated CEOs experience on 511 sample of small 
firms. They found that experience contribute to growth of firm up to a certain level after 
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which experience does not contribute to growth. They found that growth rate lessen as the 
age of CEO increase. Another study done by (Stone and Tudor, 2005) on CEO experience 
and firm performance, they surveyed 58 CEOs in publicly traded corporations. Their result 
shows that CEOs experience has a positive relationship with return on assets (ROA).  
To study the influence of CEOs education on firm performance (Gottesman and 
Morey, 2006) studied whether the better education for CEOs has an impact on firm 
performance. Better education compared based on those CEOs who attended prestigious 
school and those from less prestigious school. They found that there is no difference in firm 
performance between those firm managed by CEO with MBA and those firm managed by 
CEOs without a graduate degree. Furthermore, they found that there was no difference in 
performance of firm between those managed by CEOs from the prestigious school and those 
from less prestigious school. That is they found that there is the negative relationship between 
CEO from the prestigious school and firm performance. 
To study the influence of CEOs educational background on firm performance, 
(Gottesman and Morey, 2010) studied 390 US firms. Their question was whether better 
educated CEOs produce better firm financial performance. They examined the undergraduate 
degree CEO holds and, whether CEO has MBA or law degree or other degrees. They also 
controlled for industry effects. Their findings show that education background of CEO is not 
related to firm financial performance. Further their results indicated that CEOs with MBA or 
law degree does not outperform CEO without a graduate degree. Their main argument for the 
results was that MBA program concentrate much on quantitative-based, analytical skills 
rather than developing leadership and relational expertise that are essential for attainment of 
high level of managerial cadre.  
The study by (Bhagat et al., 2010b) on CEO education and firm performance based on 
the role played by education in replacing new CEO and the subsequent effect of education on 
firm performance. They used more than 2,600 cases of CEO for the period of 14 years. To 
measure CEO education, they set criteria of whether the CEO attended top twenty 
undergraduate schools, whether the CEO has MBA or law master degree and whether the 
master degree is from the top twenty programs.  They found that education does not play a 
role in replacing a poorly performing CEO, as they replace without due consideration of their 
education background. On the other hand, they found that, in case of new CEO who is 
replacing a poorly performing, CEO education play a significant, notable, role as there is a 
positive correlation for the new CEO and the one they replace. In case of firm performance 
with CEO education background, they found that MBA degrees have a positive impact in 
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short-term financial performance of the firm. However, they found that there is no significant 
relationship between CEO education and long term financial performance of the firm. Their 
conclusion was that CEO education does not reflect ability.  
Also, (Slater and Dixon-Fowler, 2010) studied the impact of CEO education on 
corporate environmental performance. They investigated by testing empirically 416 S&P 500 
CEOs. They studied CEO particularly with MBA education, which measured it, as 
categorical variable. The environment impact measured by looking on the firm activities 
adhere to environmental regulations. Their results showed that there is a positive relationship 
between CEO MBA education and corporate environment performance. 
In MFI, the empirical evidence literature on CEO formal business education and experience 
influence on MFI performance is few and limited; the only available literature known to the 
author is that of CEO founder, CEO gender and CEO duality of chair/CEO position.  
In microfinance, gender has influence in MFIs performance. An empirical research by 
(Strøm. et al., working paper), studied among other things the influence of female as CEO in 
MFIs performance and governance. They used data from 379 microbanks in 73 countries. In 
their study, they found that female CEO has a positive impact on financial performance but 
not on governance. Similarly, (Mersland and Strøm, 2009b) using data from 60 countries 
covering 278 MFs in the year between 2000 to 2007; they found the same results which 
shows that financial performance of MFI improves when the CEO is female. The conclusion 
for both studies on the positive impact for female CEO on MFI performance is due to female 
leadership, which is associated with more female customers, (Strøm. et al., working paper, 
Mersland and Strøm, 2009b) This attribution is in consistent with the current trend where 
there is an emphasize of empowering women through loans (Mayoux, 2010). For example, 
the study by (D’Espallier et al., 2011) concluded that female client have fewer loans defaults. 
Duality of CEO in MFI studied by (Hartarska and Mersland, 2009) found that when 
CEO position is same with board chairmanship, the MFI become less efficient. This may 
cause monitoring by the board of directors to become less effective. Similarly, study by  
(Galema et al., 2012) using 280 MFIs from 60 countries with data from 2000 to 2007 they 
found that powerful CEO in MFI is associated with higher performance variability. In their 
study, they considered the powerful CEO in MFI is the one who has dual positions, that is 
CEO/Chairman. They argued further that performance variability is driven by the CEO 
managerial discretion, of which is prevalent only when there are no stakeholder electives on 
board.  
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3.2 Theoretical Background 
This section discusses the theoretical framework of resource based view theory and upper 
echelon theory. It explains the theory and applicability of these theories in determining the 
influence of CEO formal business education, business experience on MFIs performance.  
The resources based view theory  argues that collections of resources within firm 
enables it to have unique attributes and hence better performance (Barney, 1991, Penrose, 
1959). The resources for the firm include individual and group resources. The group 
resources include organisational resources, physical resources and human resources (Barney, 
1991). The human resources categories include education and experience (Barney, 1991). 
Empirical evidence based on the resource based view theory  found that higher education of 
CEO is associated with sales growth and, experience is associated with firm growth rate (e.g. 
Rajagopalan and Datta, 1996). This shows that formal education and experience of CEO has 
influence in firm performance, and this study argues that it is applicable also for CEOs in 
MFIs.  Past literatures in both international business and MFIs emphasize the importance of 
resources and competence such as experience, managerial capability and education 
background of an employee within firm (e.g.Peteraf, 1993, Hall, 1992, Barney et al., 2011, 
Galema et al., Forthcoming, Foss, 2011). These are crucial to firm as they translate into firm 
performance (Peteraf, 1993, Wernerfelt, 1984).  
Upper echelons theory explains the relationship between managerial characteristics 
and organisational outcome. It predicts that the performance of firm partially determined by 
managerial characteristics, which are observable, particularly formal education and 
experience (Hambrick and Mason, 1984, Holger et al., 2009, Carpenter and Sanders, 2004). 
The CEO as part of the top management   team, their observable demographic profiles are 
associated with better firm performance (Troy et al., 2011, Li and Tang, 2010, Wang et al., 
2011, Ng and Sears, 2012, Louis et al., 2010, Hambrick and Mason, 1984, Holger et al., 
2009, Buyl et al., 2011). CEO education and experience are useful during strategic decision 
making because they act as indicators in determining firm performance (Wang et al., 2011, 
Ng and Sears, 2012, Waldman et al., 2004, Hambrick and Mason, 1984).  
Recently, the Upper Echelons theory empirically used to study CEO education, experience 
and firm performance, as their empirical evidence shows that CEO education and experience 
are associated with better firm performance (Li and Tang, 2010, Slater and Dixon-Fowler, 
2009, Ng and Sears, 2012, Koyuncu et al., 2010, Waldman et al., 2004, Mackey, 2008, 
Carmeli et al., 2011, Manner, 2010, Holger et al., 2009). I follow this trend of literature and 
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argue that CEO formal business education and business experience have influence in MFI 
performance. 
3.3 Conceptual framework and research hypotheses 
This section presents the hypotheses based on empirical evidence from past literature and 
theoretical background. The conceptual framework draws the hypothesized relationship 
between the CEO characteristics (education and experience) and MFI financial and outreach 
performance.    
The CEO formal business education literatures in international business argues that 
education serve as cognitive ability of CEO in understanding the business environment where 
the firm operate (Bhagat et al., 2010b, Martelli and Abels, 2010, Hansen et al., 2010, Barker 
and Mueller, 2002, Bhagat et al., 2010a, Gitsham, 2011, Jalbert et al., 2011, Dreher and 
Ryan, 2001). To link this characteristic with firm performance education classified into 
different categories like business education, law and engineering (Rajagopalan and Datta, 
1996, Jalbert et al., 2011, Martelli and Abels, 2010, Slater and Dixon-Fowler, 2010, Doms et 
al., 2010, Goh et al., 2008).  
Of all the education discipline, business education is popular among CEOs in the firm 
as it has formal training on the way to manage business successfully (Hansen et al., 2010, 
Dreher and Ryan, 2001, Slater and Dixon-Fowler, 2010, Pfeffer, 2004, David and David, 
2011). 
Empirical evidence shows that firm with CEOs with formal business education had 
their firm performance ranks higher than firm with CEO without formal business education 
(Hansen et al., 2010, Pfeffer, 2004). This study argues that this also is applicable in MFIs. 
That is MFIs with CEO with formal business education have better performance compared to 
MFIs with CEO without formal business education.  
From resource based view theory, CEO formal business education is regarded as human 
resource, which nurture basic, understanding for the CEO to have the ability in terms of 
knowledge to influence performance (Roth, 1995). From the upper echelon theory, CEO 
formal business education and the strategic choices act together to determine firm 
performance (Hambrick and Mason, 1984). This also expected in MFIs, where CEO with 
formal business education has increased financial performance compared to MFIs with CEO 
without formal business education. In case of outreach, MFIs with CEOs with formal 
business education reach more poor clients. Basing on the above arguments it is apparent 
that; 
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Hypothesis 1a: MFIs with CEO with formal business education have better financial 
performance compared with MFIs with CEO without formal business education 
Hypothesis 1b: MFIs with CEO with formal business education have better outreach 
performance compared with MFIs with CEO without formal business education 
The CEO business experience held as the top cognitive ability of CEO when it comes 
to fulfilling their duties (Rajagopalan and Datta, 1996, Zhang and Rajagopalan, 2010). CEOs 
with experience possess general knowledge, and it reflects their functional background of 
specialization (Laveren et al., 2011, Herrmann and Datta, 2006, Slater and Dixon-Fowler, 
2009, Ryan and Wang, 2011, Koyuncu et al., 2010, Elsaid et al., 2011). The functional 
background includes whether the CEO has previous experience in management of business, 
has previous international experience or number of years in a managerial position as CEO 
(Carpenter et al., 2001, Musteen et al., 2006, Troy et al., 2011, Reed and Reed, 1989, Ryan 
and Wang, 2011, Stanley, 2011, Peter and David, 2006, Bigley and Wiersema, 2002b). 
Hence, with business experience CEOs has a better understanding of various business 
scenario for, example, how to manage resources within firm (Mendelson, 2011, Lascelles et 
al., 2011).  
The newness of MFIs requires the CEO to be well knowledgeable with the customers 
it serves (Lascelles et al., 2011, Sow Hup, 2010). This is because the MFIs serve customers 
who are poor and there is a possibility of higher transactions costs and risk. The CEO with 
business experience can handle this situation especially in this period where there are diverse 
influences. Of recently MFIs the current trends for, example, innovations in the microfinance 
industry, growing concern to the lending methodologies and ownership of MFIs (Mersland 
and Strøm, forthcoming, Rahman and Nie, 2011, Valadez and Buskirk, 2011b, Hoque et al., 
2011, Byström, 2008, Mersland and Strøm, 2010, Mersland, 2009b).  
Empirical evidence finds that CEO with business experience have better firm 
performance compared with firm without business experience (Reed and Reed, 1989, 
Laveren et al., 2011, Eubanks, 1992, Herrmann and Datta, 2006, Slater and Dixon-Fowler, 
2009, Ryan and Wang, 2011, Elsaid et al., 2011, Stanley, 2011). This study argues that it is 
also applicable in MFIs (Hartarska and Mersland, 2009).  
The arguments from the resource based view theory contends that business experience 
enable the CEOs to deploy their know how in MFI to drive better performance. The upper 
echelon theory contends that CEO with experience has a better understanding of strategic 
choice that has influences on MFI performance. This study argues that MFIs with CEO with 
business experience have better performance. Therefore, I hypothesize that 
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Hypothesis 2a: MFIs with CEO with business experience have better financial performance 
compared with MFIs with CEO without business experience. 
Hypothesis 2b: MFIs with CEO with business experience have more outreach performance 
compared with MFIs with CEO without business experience. 
The conceptual framework took into considerations of the resource based view theory, 
which regards CEOs in human resources perspective as the resources having business 
experience and business education to drive firm performance. The upper echelons theory 
regards the CEOs business education and business experience as characteristics which 
influence firm performance (Hambrick and Mason, 1984, Barney, 1991). Given the above 
argument, following is the conceptual framework in figure 3-1.  
 
Fig 3-1 Conceptual Framework 
 
Source: Author own constructs 
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Business 
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CHAPTER FOUR:  RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This chapter presents source of data, the procedures used in gathering data and data validity 
and reliability in general. The measurements of concepts used in the study and the conceptual 
model applied in this study. The data analysis approach, managing omitted variable bias and 
econometrics analysis. The assumptions of multiple regression analysis, the issue of 
instrumental variable approach and the choice between fixed effect model (FEM) and random 
effect model (REM). 
4.1 Data and sample  
This study uses data from rated MFIs (Mersland et al., 2011) This dataset consists of 403 
MFIs gathered in 74 countries. Table 4-1 in the next page shows the list of countries and 
number of MFIs. The information for this data was extracted from www.ratingfund2.org, a 
publicly available website. The dataset information’s in the www.ratingfund2.org are from 
the five rating agencies risk assessment reports that include MicroRate, Microfinanza, Planet 
Rating, Crisil and M-Cril. The rating agencies were selected based on approval by the Rating 
Fund of the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (Mersland et al., 2011) and are the leading 
five players in the rating of MFIs, and their rating report contains most of MFIs information. 
The methods use the rating agencies to assess MFIs are almost similar and there is no 
difference found.   
This study is not the only one using dataset from rating report to write a master thesis. 
There are several others studies written based on rating agencies reports (e.g. Mersland, 
2009a). Also, there are several articles in different journals written based on extracting 
information from rating report (e.g. Galema et al., 2012) used extracted information from 
rating report to study sample of  280 MFI, which its finding recently published in Journal of 
Management Studies. Therefore, the quality of information from the source is well 
recognised in the academics.  
Sample selection procedures considered inclusion of sample in the dataset based on 
only rated MFIs. This is because most of the rated MFIs are the one able, and willing to be 
rated and had most of the rating categories being represented in the data. This helped to 
eliminate the background noise.   
The missing data account for 25% in overall, and it varies from 0% for some variables 
and to above 70% to other variables. The effect has been accounted for by using STATA. 
 
 
14 
 
 
Table 4-1 List of countries and number of microfinance institutions 
Number Country Name 
Number of 
MFIs Number Country Name Number of MFIs 
1 Albania 3 38 Romania 1 
2 Argentina 1 39 Russian Federation 15 
3 Armenia 3 40 Senegal 10 
4 Benin 9 41 South Africa 3 
5 Bolivia 15 42 Sri Lanka 1 
6 Bosnia Hercegovina 12 43 Tanzania 5 
7 Brazil 13 44 Togo 4 
8 Bulgaria 2 45 Trinidad and Tobago 1 
9 Burkina Faso 4 46 Tunisia 1 
10 Cambodia 13 47 Uganda 10 
11 Chile 2 48 Montenegro 2 
12 Colombia 6 49 Cameroun 5 
13 Dominican Republic 4 50 Guinee 1 
14 Ecuador 18 51 East Timor 1 
15 Egypt 5 52 Bangladesh 2 
16 El Salvador 6 53 Nepal 5 
17 Ethiopia 10 54 Vietnam 1 
18 Georgia 6 55 Azerbaijan 7 
19 Guatemala 6 56 Mongolia 2 
20 Haiti 3 57 Nigeria 3 
21 Honduras 8 58 Mozambique 1 
22 India 32 59 Tajikistan 7 
23 Indonesia 2 60 Croatia 1 
24 Jordan 3 61 Chad 1 
25 Kazakhstan 4 62 Rwanda 4 
26 Kenya 9 63 Zambia 1 
27 Kyrgyzstan 4 64 China 1 
28 Madagascar 2 65 Serbia 1 
29 Mali 3 66 Ghana 4 
30 Mexico 18 67 Malawi 1 
31 Moldova 2 68 Gambia 1 
32 Morocco 6 69 Kosovo 4 
33 Nicaragua 13 70 Rep of Congo Brazzaville 1 
34 Pakistan 1 71 Burundi 1 
35 Paraguay 2 72 Niger 3 
36 Peru 32 73 DRC - Kinshasa 1 
37 Philippines 7 74 Zambia 1 
Total Number of MFIs 403 
Source: Author owns constructs from MFIs panel dataset 2001 to 2009 
4.2 Operationalization and measurement of concepts 
According to (Sager, 1976) the operational definition or research definition is the definition 
of the concept which its properties or operations can be measured through observation.  For 
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non-observable operational definition, their events, presence or absence behavior can be 
measured by inferring to the behaviour that can be observed. This study operationalizes the 
following concepts based on the theories. This study uses dependent variables comprises of 
adjusted return on assets (AROA) and portfolio at risk for 30 days (PaR30) to measure 
financial performance, and average loan size, percentage of women clients and credit clients 
to capture outreach performance. The independent variables are CEO with formal business 
education and CEO with business experience. I also use set of control variables. The 
following sections explain each of these variables, and at the end, a table of summary with 
explanations of the way measured each variable is presented. 
The concept of education measured by (Soriano and Castrogiovanni, 2012) based on 
the formal business education acquired at the university either undergraduate or graduate 
courses. Similarly, education measured by (Gottesman and Morey, 2010) based on MBA. 
This measure implies business education, and in this study education uses as an independent 
variable in determining its influence on MFI performance. Particularly, education measures 
as university level undergraduate or graduate in business, banking, accounting, management, 
and economics and similar. It assigns 1 if CEO has formal business education or 0 if CEO 
does not have formal business education. 
The concept of experience defined by (Begley and Boyd, 1985, Dyke et al., 1992, 
Stuart and Abetti, 1990) as the total time the CEO has been in that position or the time has 
been with the firm, previous years in management of business and ownership. To measure the 
concept of experience (Sandberg and Hofer, 1987) uses dummy to indicate the presence or 
absence of  business experience.  This study uses experience as an independent variable in 
determining its influence in MFI performance. Experience used as business experience where 
CEO has either ownership or management of business prior to becoming the CEO and if the 
CEO is hired within the MFI. This   study assigns 1 if CEO has business experience or 0 if 
CEO does not have business experience. 
Control variables used in this study includes MFI specifics control variables and 
country control variables to minimize the possibility of associating the influence of 
independent variables for which they are not responsible for the change in the dependent 
variable (Hair, 2010, Zikmund et al., 2010).  This study uses control variables recently used 
in MFI literature (Galema et al., 2012, Mersland et al., 2011). It includes MFI experience, 
which indicates the number of years that the MFIs have been in operation. MFI size assessed 
by the amount of assets it owns and used as the natural logarithm. Regulation, which shows if 
the MFI is included in the formal banking regulation of which according to (Galema et al., 
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2012) regulated act as hints for loan provider, as a trust to the MFI itself and, indicates the 
MFI follow the formal institutions of the jurisdictions they operate. Competition means local 
level of MFI competition. HDI means human development index which control country 
specifics like institutions and differing background (Mersland and Strøm, 2009a) Also, this 
study uses regional dummies for Asia, Latin America, Africa, Middle East and Eastern 
Europe. The following table 4-2 below summarise all the independent variables and control 
variables. 
Table 4-2 Explanations of independent and control variables 
 
Independent 
variables 
 
Explanation (measure) 
Hypothesis 
Financial 
(AROA, 
PaR30) 
Outreach (Average loan size, 
Percentage women clients and 
credit clients) 
CEO formal business 
education 
A dummy with value of 1 if CEO has 
business education 
+/- +/- 
CEO business 
experience 
A dummy with value of 1 if CEO has 
business experience 
+/- +/- 
Control variables 
MFI size logarithm of MFI total asset 
MFI age Number of years since the establishment  
Competition A self-constructed measure of the local level of competition where 1 mean 
little or no competition and 7 high competition 
Regulation A dummy with value of 1 if the MFI is regulated by banking authority 
Regional A dummies for Latin America, Africa, Middle East and Eastern Europe  
Human Development 
Index (HDI) 
An index ranking for each country covering health, education and income 
(GDP per capita in PPP terms (constant 2005 international $)
3
 
 
MFIs have dual objectives hence their performance is captured based on financial 
performance and outreach performance (Mersland and Strøm, 2009b). I measure financial 
performance using return on assets (profitability) and portfolio quality (PaR30).  
I use adjusted return on assets (aroa) to measure MFIs profitability. I adjusted for 
inflation                               . It measures the extent which the MFIs uses 
it assets to generate return, that is      
                    
                     
 (Galema et al., 2012). This 
                                                 
3
 Source http://hdr.undp.org/en/data/build/ as also used by MERSLAND, R. & STRØM, Ø. R. 2009a. 
Performance and governance in microfinance institutions. Journal of Banking & Finance, 33, 662-669. 
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measure was used in (Mersland. et al., 2011 pp. 19) to capture the overall financial 
performance in MFIs industry as they argued that due to differing organisational forms of 
MFI where others are owned, others are without owners and differing objectives as others are 
after profit while others are not for profit. The effect of this differing organisation form lead 
to differing debt/equity levels between MFIs, hence this make ROA to be the best proxy 
measure for capturing financial performance than using return on equity (ROE). 
To measure portfolio at quality this study uses a proxy measure of Portfolio at risk 
(PaR30) which shows the ability to collect loan. Furthermore, this measure can be regarded 
as a proxy for competence of management, because the loan repayment is a key to the 
survival of the MFI in order to continue serving other clients (D’Espallier et al., 2011, 
Mersland and Strøm, 2008).  
Par30 is computed as; 
                   
                                                                    
                                         
 
I use average loan size,  percentage of women clients and number of credit clients to 
capture the depth of outreach performance (Mersland et al., 2011, Mersland and Strøm, 
2009a).  
I measure the average loan size as: 
                                                                (Galema et al., 2012 
pp. 11). 
The following table 4-3 below summarises the explanations of all dependent variables 
used in this study. 
Table 4-3 Summary of dependent variables used in the study 
Variable Explanation (Measure) 
Financial Performance/profitability 
AROA Return on assets (ROA) at the end of a given period, Adjusted for 
inflation =                                               
Par30 The fraction of the portfolio with more than 30 days in arrears 
Outreach Performance 
Average loan size Average loan size =                               
                                  
 
Women clients Percentage of women clients 
Credit clients Number of credit clients 
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4.3 The conceptual model 
The relationship between the dependent and independent variables in this study is explained 
using panel data model. The panel data is a set of data comprising recurring observations of 
the same individual (e.g. MFIs) collected over a number of periods e.g. years (Baum, 2006, 
Cameron and Trivedi, 2009, Gujarati and Porter, 2010, Johnston and DiNardo, 1997, 
Wooldridge, 2006). The panel data combine cross-section and time series data of the same 
individual collected over time (Gujarati, 2003). 
Since the panel data provides a relationship, over time to individual (e.g. MFIs), this 
implies that these individuals are bound to be heterogeneous. The panel data estimation takes 
into considerations such heterogeneity by allowing individual-specific (MFI) variables to be 
tested (Studenmund, 2006).  
Therefore, in the course of establishing a relationship between dependent and 
independent variables given a focus to individual characteristics of MFIs, such as MFIs 
country, MFI year of the report, MFI type and so on, a panel data was considered to be an 
appropriate tool. This is because; the panel data can measure and detect appropriately the 
effects that cannot easily be detected by using pure cross-sectional data or pure time series 
data (Gujarati and Porter, 2010, Johnston and DiNardo, 1997, Wooldridge, 2006). 
Furthermore, the panel data is flexible, it gives more information on data analysis, it has more 
variability; it has less collinearity among variables, and enhance efficiency (Gujarati, 2003 
pp. 637). Following is a general panel data regression model (Bollen and Brand, 2010).  
 
                      
Where; 
       Represent the dependent variable (measure of financial sustainability and outreach) 
for cross-section unit i at time t, where i = 1….n and t = 1…..T 
     Represent heterogeneity or an individual effect which comprises the constant term in 
the model, and it contain set of observable individual or group specific variables for 
example MFIs type, MFIs region and so on, or unobserved MFI characteristics (for 
example composition of governance mechanism within the MFIs) which are 
considered to not to vary over time (Wooldridge, 2006). 
  Represent the partial effect measure of       in time t for the unit i 
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    Represent the j
th 
predictor variable for unit i at time t. In this study there are K 
predictor variables indexed by j=1…….K which means that      is a K dimensional 
vector 
    Represent the error term 
Operational models for the above general equations are presented in the linear regression 
section.  
The presented previous model can be adapted for use either with fixed effect model or 
random effect model. The fixed effect model assumes that the individual effect of    is 
correlated with the predictor variable     while the random effect model assume that the 
individual effect    is not correlated with the predictor variable     hence, the error term in 
random effects become (        ), whereby    is the specific random effects element for the 
group which is similar to      except that with   , for every group there is a single draw that is 
considered into the regression identically for each time (Gujarati and Porter, 2010, 
Wooldridge, 2006). 
4.4 Data analysis approach 
The data from the dataset were put together and in an acceptable format to enable inter-MFI 
comparison. Then, converted into the CSV (comma delimited) format, that enables 
transferring to STATA econometric software for analysis. 
This   study uses STATA for data analysis because it is enabling efficient and easy 
data analysis for researchers (Baum, 2006, Cameron and Trivedi, 2009). Furthermore, 
STATA software ability to analyse panel data in a range of time and units fits the purposes of   
this study, hence appropriate software for this study (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009). The 
STATA software also is user friendly and interactive to the researchers. The online technical 
support and abundance of learning resources available makes this software more convenient 
for uses in this study. Also one of its advantages over other statistical software packages is 
that it follows strict rules with its commanding syntax, for example in grammatical terms, 
there are few notable irregular verbs (Baum et al., 2011). Also, makes easy for panel data 
implementation in regression (Baum, 2006, Cameron and Trivedi, 2009). Lastly, it is 
convenient to use this software because the researcher is knowledgeable in use of this 
statistical software, and has a full time access to it. 
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4.5 Managing Omitted Variables Bias    
With multivariate models, there is a possibility that the coefficient derived from regression 
analysis suffers from the omitted variable bias (Børing, 2010, Sessions and Stevans, 2006). 
This effect occurs when the models suffer from missing variable which has influence on the 
dependent variables, and this may lead into affecting the coefficients in the model which may 
be biased and hence misleading (Chamberlain, 1985). This requires controlling of the 
unobserved  effects of these omitted variable (Kim and Frees, 2006). Following is the general 
equation model for unobserved effect (Wooldridge, 2006 pp. 251 ): 
                   
Where;                           
      Is 1 × K which may contain variables that; 
 Vary across t but not i 
 Vary across i but not t 
 Vary across i and t 
       Unobserved heterogeneity or individual effects or individual heterogeneity 
                      The idiosyncratic errors as it vary across t as well as across i 
Therefore, from the above equation, controlling for unobserved effects largely depends on the 
nature of the omitted variable, that is, whether is changing over time or is constant over time, 
and whether is changing over cases or is constant overs cases (Kim and Frees, 2006). This 
phenomenon sometimes known as time specific and unit (case) specific effect of the 
unobserved variable (Gujarati and Porter, 2010, Studenmund, 2006).  From the econometric 
literatures, there are several methods for dealing with omitted variables. Two of these are 
fixed effects model and random effects model (Kim and Frees, 2006, Børing, 2010, Cameron 
and Trivedi, 2009, Gujarati and Porter, 2010, Johnston and DiNardo, 1997, Studenmund, 
2006, Wooldridge, 2006).  
The fixed effect model assumes that the constant term differences can capture the 
difference across cases or MFIs as used in this study. This allows the unobserved individual 
case effects to be controlled by correlating it with predictor variable (Gujarati and Porter, 
2010, Studenmund, 2006, Wooldridge, 2006). This gets rid of the effects of the unobserved 
effects from the predictor variable, and, hence enables assessment of the predictors’ net effect 
(Gujarati and Porter, 2010, Wooldridge, 2006). Hence, the changes in variables over time 
(given the result of unobserved effect of omitted variable), can be utilised when estimating 
the effect of predictor variables on the criterion variable. This makes the fixed effect model to 
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be suitable when one want to control for the omitted variable that differ across case (MFI) 
which exhibit constant variation over time (Baum, 2006, Johnston and DiNardo, 1997, 
Studenmund, 2006, Wooldridge, 2006, Kim and Frees, 2006). The random effect is 
appropriate when one want to control the omitted variable that is the same across case (MFI) 
but exhibit difference over time (Johnston and DiNardo, 1997, Studenmund, 2006, 
Wooldridge, 2006, Greene, 2012).  
The advantage with the random effect is that it includes the unobserved heterogeneity, 
while in fixed effect it is absorbed by the intercept (Greene, 2012, Gujarati and Porter, 2010, 
Wooldridge, 2006). The disadvantage of the random effects is its assumption of uncorrelated 
relationship between the predictor variable with the unobserved effects. Many researchers 
think it as unrealistic assumptions. The unobserved heterogeneity usually correlates with the 
predictor variables (Baum, 2006, Børing, 2010, Greene, 2012, Kim and Frees, 2006, Stock 
and Watson, 2003). This assumption make the fixed effect model superior to random effect as 
it does not include such assumption (e.g. Sven and Daniel, 2007).  
However, this has to be taken with precautions, because there is a scenario where the 
random effect is more appropriate to use. This is when the omitted variable effect differs 
across case but are constant over time (as the case with fixed effect model), and provided the 
omitted variable effect are constant but change over time (Greene, 2012, Gujarati and Porter, 
2010). If the assumptions hold, the random effects estimator is more efficient since it allows 
identification of the intercept which is differenced out under fixed effects. Given the above 
arguments of fixed effect model and random effect model the researcher rely on the Hausman 
test (Hausman, 1978) to measure the appropriateness of each model assumptions for use in 
this study.  
4.6 The Econometric analysis 
This section discusses the econometric analysis approaches used in the study, this include, the 
correlation analysis, Multicollinearity, assumptions of multiple regression analysis, the choice 
between fixed effect model and random effect model. 
I run correlation analysis using STATA to determine whether the variables correlate or not. 
However the results show the variables were correlated. The correlation analysis also helped 
to determine the extent of multicollinearity for the variables. The table below shows the 
correlation of the variables. From table 4-4 in the next page, it shows that the correlations 
coefficient for CEO business experience and business education is 0.3823. 
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Multicollinearity occurs when there is a high but not perfect correlation among the 
independent variables within the multiple regression models. 
Table 4-4 Correlations analysis 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9   10 
 (1)CEO=Experience 1 
          (2)CEO=Education 0.3823 1 
         (3)MFI age 0.0554 0.1699 1 
        (4)MFI size 0.0914 0.1579 0.2045 1 
       (5)Regulation 0.0377 0.0927 0.0350 0.1459 1 
      (6)Competition -0.0603 0.0251 0.1965 0.2498 -0.026 1 
     (7)Human Dev. Index -0.0449 -0.107 -0.0879 -0.032 -0.317 0.0759 1 
    (8)Latin America 0.0243 0.1166 0.1325 0.0368 -0.177 0.2718 0.3667 1 
   (9)Africa 0.0687 0.1560 0.0481 0.0399 0.225 -0.152 -0.807 -0.379 1 
  (10)Middle East 0.0516 0.0940 -0.1126 0.0794 -0.049 -0.162 0.0139 -0.16 -0.099 1 
 (11)Eastern Europe -0.0803 -0.223 -0.2823 0.0210 -0.017 -0.047 0.343 -0.398 -0.246 -0.1037 1 
 
The results of high multicollinearity are contrary to the expectations for the independent 
variables to correlate with the dependent variables, and the problem is not on the model 
specification but it relates to the sample (Verbeek, 2012, Hair, 2010). This can cause in the 
decreases of the explanatory power information of the independent variables to the dependent 
variables and, hence may draw a wrong conclusion that the independent variables are not 
related to the dependent variables (Hair, 2010). With multicollinearity, the standard errors for 
the estimated regression coefficient are relatively large, but are not biased estimates (Greene, 
2012, Verbeek, 2012).  
The extent with which correlation can cause multicollinearity is not well set. Scholars 
in econometrics and statistics have difference view as to the cut-off in the correlation that 
could alarm existence of multicollinearity. In their book (Hair, 2010) argue that the cut-off 
point is 0.9 correlation coefficient of which below that there is no effect of multicollinearity. 
Others (Bagheri and Midi, 2009) argue that when the correlation coefficient exceed 0.9 then 
multicollinearity can be detected. Both authors have the same cut off point of 0.9 correlation 
coefficients. However, (Wooldridge, 2006) argue differently, he affirm that there is no 
absolute number to conclude that there is multicollinearity problem, the only hints that will 
tell that whether there is multicollinearity or not is when there is a high correlation between 
the overall sample variation (SST) and the respective individual variables variance (δ2). This 
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study took an approach in assessing, determining the multicollinearity and applying the 
remedies thereof (Hair, 2010) 
The correlation coefficient between the moderated effect of CEO business experience 
and business education is lower than the suggested cut off point of 0.9 (Hair, 2010). This 
correlations coefficient provides a hint of no problem of multicollinearity. 
Furthermore, Multicollinearity can also be detected by calculating variance of 
inflation factor (VIF) for each coefficient. This test statistics is used as a diagnostic tool to 
detect the seriousness of multicollinearity problem (Mansfield and Helms, 1982). There is no 
consensus for cut-off point for VIF, for example (Hair, 2010, Gujarati, 2003, Curto and Pinto, 
2011) argues that VIF above 10.0 means there is a multicollinearity problem while (Greene, 
2003) argued that VIF below 20.0, there is no multicollinearity problem. Furthermore, (Hair, 
2010) argue that the  is 0.9 cut-off for tolerance  value which corresponds to VIF of 10.0 
The literature in econometrics lays down methods that can be used to handle 
multicollinearity problem in dataset. These are omit one or more variable suggested by (Hair, 
2010) that is causing multicollinearity, do nothing, increase the sample size or just obtain 
more data as the problem may be corrected if the sample size is more than 100 observations 
(Gujarati, 2003, Gujarati and Porter, 2010, Verbeek, 2012). The problem can be corrected by 
doing variable transformation (Hair, 2010). 
To see if there is a multicollinearity problem, variance of inflation factor (VIF) was 
calculated using collinearity diagnostic tool in STATA.  
The results in table 4-5 in the next page, show that CEO business experience has the 
VIF value of 1.18 while CEO business education has VIF of 1.31, which implies that they 
both below the VIF value of 10 (Hair, 2010).  
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Table 4-5 Variance of Inflation Factor (VIF) 
Variable VIF SQRT VIF Tolerance R-Squared 
CEO=Business experience 1.18 1.09 0.8463 0.1537 
CEO=Business education 1.31 1.15 0.7613 0.2387 
MFI age 1.22 1.10 0.8201 0.1799 
MFI size 1.20 1.10 0.8301 0.1699 
Regulation 1.17 1.08 0.8548 0.1452 
Competition 1.24 1.11 0.8066 0.1934 
Human Dev. Index 3.67 1.92 0.2725 0.7275 
Latin America 2.24 1.50 0.447 0.553 
Africa 3.28 1.81 0.3046 0.6954 
Middle East 1.29 1.14 0.7744 0.2256 
Eastern Europe 2.15 1.47 0.4657 0.5343 
Mean VIF       1.81 
    
The above table confirms that there is no multicollinearity. Moreover the sample size is large 
enough (403 cases) and the use of panel data analysis offer more options that lead to reduced 
multicollinearity problem (Mersland and Strøm, 2008).   
The linear regression model used incorporated additive to cover the hypotheses and 
conceptual framework that established in this study. Hypothesis H1a, H2a on CEO 
characteristics and MFI financial performance linear regression equation 1 and 2. Linear 
regression equation 3, 4 and 5 tests H1b and H2b which is CEO characteristics and MFI 
outreach performance. The regression models were run with and without control variables. In 
order to interpret the results in a meaningful way; the models were tested for robustness. 
Following are the linear regression models; 
 CEO characteristics and MFI profitability 
                                                             ………... (1) 
Where; 
       =Return on assets for MFI i at time t, where i=1…..n and t=1….T 
CEOBEXP=CEO business experience 
CEOBEDU=CEO business education  
Controls = control variables (MFI size, age, competition, HDI, bank regulation and region 
dummies) 
   Unobserved heterogeneity MFI specific effect 
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     The idiosyncratic errors as it vary across t as well as across i 
 CEO characteristics and portfolio quality 
                                                              ……… (2) 
Where; 
         = Portfolio at risk with more than 30 days in arrears for MFI i at time t 
 CEO characteristics and MFI outreach 
                                                              ……….. (3) 
Where; 
        = Average loan size for MFI i at time t 
                                                                 …… (4) 
Where; 
           =Percentage of women clients for MFI i at time t 
                                                                  ….... (5) 
Where; 
            = Number Credit clients for MFI i at time t 
4.7 Assumptions of multiple regression analysis 
This section focuses in investigating whether the variables in the regression equation meets 
these assumptions (Hair, 2010).These assumptions need to be met for the regression model to 
precisely, predict the actual relationship among the variables (Hair, 2010). These are 
particularly necessary when estimating the regression coefficients and dependent variable 
prediction (Hair, 2010). The assumptions include linearity of the relationship between 
dependent variables and independent variables, constant variance of the error term, 
independence of the error terms and normality of the error term.  
To test for Heteroscedasticity I use Breusch-Pagan test, which offer a test of a null 
hypothesis that there is no heteroscedasticity across the range of independent variables. The 
test results were not statistically significant (p>0.05 for 5 percent significant level) for 
determinants of credit clients (CrClients), hence I failed to reject the null hypothesis. The test 
results were statistically significant for determinants of profitability (aroa), determinants of 
portfolio quality (PaR30), determinants of average loan size (Lsize) and, determinants of 
percentage of women clients (Wclients); hence I rejected the null hypothesis (See table 4-6 
from page 26 to 27 for detailed results). The presence of unequal variance, made this study 
26 
 
run these regression models with constant error as suggested by econometrics literature 
(Greene, 2012, Studenmund, 2006, Verbeek, 2012). 
Table 4-6 Breusch-Pagan tests for heteroscedasticity 
Determinants of profitability (AROA) 
 
 
 
 
Determinants of portfolio quality (PaR30) 
 
Determinants of average loan size (Lsize) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.0013
         chi2(1)      =    10.36
         Variables: fitted values of aroa
         Ho: Constant variance
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
. hettest
         Prob > chi2  =   0.0000
         chi2(1)      =    89.88
         Variables: fitted values of PaR30
         Ho: Constant variance
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
. hettest
         Prob > chi2  =   0.0000
         chi2(1)      =  1819.38
         Variables: fitted values of Lsize
         Ho: Constant variance
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
. hettest
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Determinants of percentage of women clients (Wclients) 
 
 
Determinants of credit clients (CrClients) 
 
 
To test the normality of the error term this study uses normal probability plot (Hair, 2010). 
The MFI size (assets) was not normally distributes. Hence a log transformation was 
computed and the results are shown in table 4-7 below. 
Table 4-7 Transformation of variable assets (MFI size) 
 
 
 
All other variables were normally distributed. 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.0798
         chi2(1)      =     3.07
         Variables: fitted values of Wclients
         Ho: Constant variance
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
. hettest
         Prob > chi2  =   0.0000
         chi2(1)      =   500.44
         Variables: fitted values of CrClients
         Ho: Constant variance
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
. hettest
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To test for autocorrelation of the error term I use Wooldridge test for autocorrelation 
in panel data which test the null hypothesis that there is no first order autocorrelation (see 
table 4-8 below for detailed information). The test results for determinants of credit clients 
(CrClients) were not significant (p<0.05 for 5 percent significant level), hence I failed to 
reject the null hypothesis.   
 
Table 4-8 Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
           Prob > F =      0.0000
    F(  1,      83) =     44.790
H0: no first order autocorrelation
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data
. xtserial aroa CEOBEXP CEOBEDU `controls'
           Prob > F =      0.0001
    F(  1,     120) =     15.602
H0: no first order autocorrelation
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data
. xtserial PaR30 CEOBEXP CEOBEDU `controls'
           Prob > F =      0.0000
    F(  1,     123) =     63.750
H0: no first order autocorrelation
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data
. xtserial Lsize CEOBEXP CEOBEDU `controls'
           Prob > F =      0.0383
    F(  1,       1) =    275.552
H0: no first order autocorrelation
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data
. xtserial Wclients CEOBEXP CEOBEDU `controls'
           Prob > F =      0.8885
    F(  1,     123) =      0.020
H0: no first order autocorrelation
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data
. xtserial CrClients CEOBEXP CEOBEDU `controls'
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The test results for determinants of profitability (aroa), determinants of portfolio quality 
(PaR30), determinants of average loan size (Lsize) and determinants of women clients 
(Wclients) were all statistically significant (p<0.05 for 5 percent significant level); hence 
rejected the null hypothesis. The presence of first order autocorrelation, made this study run 
the regression model with standard error as suggested in econometrics literature (Gujarati and 
Porter, 2010, Stock and Watson, 2003). 
4.8 Instrumental variable approach  
The objective of this study was to examine the effects of CEO characteristics (CEO formal 
business education and business experience) on performance of MFIs. Given the causal 
relationship I predicted, sometimes the MFIs may influence the CEO characteristics. Its 
influence can emanate from being big or having better both financial and outreach 
performance. This may lead into recruiting well educated (in the area of business education) 
and well experience (in the area of business experience). Under such situation MFI 
performance and CEO characteristics depends on each other (Marra and Radice, 2011). This 
relationship creates a causal relationship to be on both directions, a problem which is called 
endogeneity of the independent variables which is the main focus of the study in predicting 
the dependent variable (Marra and Radice, 2011).  If such situation exist it requires use of 
simultaneous equations models (Gujarati, 2011, Gujarati and Porter, 2010).  
The solution to such a situation is the use of instrumental variables approach as 
suggested in the econometrics literature (e.g. Wooldridge, 2006). This method provides 
consistent outcomes and is applicable in all form of analysis (Johnston and DiNardo, 1997, 
Studenmund, 2006, Wooldridge, 2006). This offers a means by which it is possible to get 
consistent estimator for when the predictor variables that are correlated with the error term 
(Stock and Watson, 2003). To test the existence of endogeneity between CEO characteristics 
and MFIs performance, I run instrumental variable two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation 
to obtain the Wu-Hausman F test and Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-sq test for each regression 
equation (Masaaki et al., 2011).  
Table 4-9 testing for endogeneity results 
                                                               
Tests of endogeneity of:             CEOBEDU CEOBEXP 
H0: Regressor is exogenous     
Wu-Hausman F test:    P-value 0.30551 0.44793 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-sq test:  P-value 0.29915 0.44158 
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Tests of endogeneity of:               CEOBEDU      CEOBEXP 
H0: Regressor is exogenous     
Wu-Hausman F test:   P-value  0.05652  0.07016 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-sq test: P-value  0.05486  0.06814 
 
                                                                
Tests of endogeneity of:                       CEOBEDU   CEOBEXP 
H0: Regressor is exogenous     
Wu-Hausman F test:   P-value   0.0748  0.9741 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-sq test: P-value   0.0739  0.9740 
 
                                                                 
Tests of endogeneity of:            CEOBEDU   CEOBEXP 
H0: Regressor is exogenous 
Wu-Hausman F test:                    P-value    0.10264 0.36225 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-sq test:        P-value    0.09645 0.34879 
 
                                                                  
Tests of endogeneity of:     CEOBEDU       CEOBEXP 
H0: Regressor is exogenous 
Wu-Hausman F test:                  P-value    0.23105  0.85277 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-sq test:      P-value    0.22503  0.85051 
 
From the results in tables 4-9, I tested the null hypothesis that the Regressor (either 
CEOBEDU or CEOBEXP) is exogenous. All the P-values are higher than 5 percent (P>0.05 
at 5% significant level). Therefore, I fail to reject the null hypothesis in all case that the 
Regressor is exogenous. Hence I conclude that CEO business education (CEOBEDU) and 
CEO business experience (CEOBEXP) are all exogenous variables in the regression 
equations uses to evaluate the model.  
31 
 
4.9 The choice between fixed effect model or random effect model 
The use of panel data model allows using either the fixed effect models or random effect 
models to estimates the dependence relationship among the variables, while taking care the 
issue of omitted variables. The decision of whether to use fixed effect or random effect 
models was made based on the results of Hausman test as suggested in the econometrics 
literature (Baum, 2006, Chamberlain, 1985, Stock and Watson, 2003, Verbeek, 2012, 
Wooldridge, 2006). Table 4-10 show detailed results for the Hausman test and table 4-11 
shows summarised results for the choice of the model.  
Table 4-10 Hausman test 
Determinants of profitability (AROA) 
 
Determinants of Portfolio quality (PaR30) 
 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.1971
                          =        8.60
                  chi2(6) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
      LatinA      -.032546    -.0354563        .0029103        .1259948
     MFIsize     -.1111447     .0568407       -.1679853        .0989882
      MFIage      .0420736     .0016794        .0403943        .0174841
         hdi     -2.210625     .0475361       -2.258161        1.938425
  Regulation     -.2169349    -.0615208       -.1554141        .1033061
 Competition      -.015015     .0042918       -.0193068        .0290122
                                                                              
                     fe           re         Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
. hausman fe re
                Prob>chi2 =      0.9642
                          =        1.43
                  chi2(6) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
      LatinA      .0361179     .0201253        .0159925        .1203207
     MFIsize     -.0314872     -.038391        .0069038        .0655606
      MFIage      .0035804     .0027212        .0008592         .009701
         hdi      .3445742    -.0495416        .3941159        1.789824
  Regulation      .0020437     .0167473       -.0147037        .0189982
 Competition     -.0146404     .0008625       -.0155029        .0164937
                                                                              
                     fe           re         Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
. hausman fe re
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Determinants of average loan size (Lsize) 
 
 
Determinants of percentage of women clients (Wclients) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite)
                Prob>chi2 =      0.5080
                          =        5.28
                  chi2(6) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
      LatinA     -.2667962     .5465986       -.8133949        .3971688
     MFIsize      .1073759    -.2989781         .406354        .2485243
      MFIage     -.0371241    -.0064502       -.0306739        .0403167
         hdi     -5.123757     .3672725       -5.491029        7.910399
  Regulation      .0511063     .1250261       -.0739198        .0417709
 Competition      .0160854    -.0135836         .029669        .0834212
                                                                              
                     fe           re         Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
. hausman fe re
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite)
                Prob>chi2 =      0.1472
                          =        8.17
                  chi2(5) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
     MFIsize      .0150331    -.0177035        .0327366        .1175202
      MFIage     -.0036629     .0022717       -.0059346        .0310397
         hdi      2.815781      1.13776        1.678022        1.069967
  Regulation     -.0237408    -.0179774       -.0057634        .0042089
 Competition     -.0086884     .0052816         -.01397        .0168393
                                                                              
                     fe           re         Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
. hausman fe re
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Determinants of credit clients (CrClients) 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4-11 results Fixed Effect Model vs. Random Effect Model Hausman Test 
Variable Fixed Effect Model            Random Effect Model 
Profitability (AROA) X   
 
 
Portfolio quality (PaR30) X   
 
 
Outreach (average Loan size, 
percentage of women clients, 
credit clients) 
X   
Source: Author own constructs 
Key:  X= Not appropriate; 
  = Appropriate  
From the Hausman test table 4-10 and table 4-11 which show summary of the results, the 
conclusion is that, there is a failure to reject the null hypothesis of “difference in coefficients 
not systematic” to determinants of profitability (aroa), determinants of portfolio quality 
(PaR30), determinants of average loan size (Lsize), determinants of percentage of women 
clients (Wclients) and, determinants of credit client (CrClients). This is because the value of 
is                      . Therefore, this implies that, these are analysed using the random 
effects model.  
                Prob>chi2 =      0.8136
                          =        2.96
                  chi2(6) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
      LatinA      524.9933    -8688.773        9213.766        10384.01
     MFIsize      13315.42     17414.15       -4098.729        5651.443
      MFIage      376.4987    -39.26258        415.7613        856.2036
         hdi      47561.51    -59798.61        107360.1        159570.8
  Regulation      -3524.48    -2645.105       -879.3746        1350.661
 Competition     -1811.413     -330.204       -1481.209        1368.395
                                                                              
                     fe           re         Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
. hausman fe re
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CHAPTER FIVE: DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
This chapter presents the finding and empirical analysis of the relationships predicted in the 
hypotheses. The empirical analyses include use of random effect model. Relationships 
between variables are presented with brief comments on this chapter and, fully discussions 
are done on the next chapter.  
Tab 5-1 Descriptive statistics for dependent, independent and control variables 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N 
Dependent variables 
Adjusted Return on Assets (AROA) 0.0105 0.1217 -0.9900 0.3420 1421 
Portfolio at risk (PaR30) 0.0634 0.0967 -0.2710 0.9730 1465 
Average loan size 1.1584 7.1619 0.0000 175.4167 1390 
Percentage of women clients 0.7087 0.2520 0.0000 1.0000 243 
Credit clients 12909.18 27295.36 0.0000 394462 1438 
Independent variables 
CEO business experience 0.6387 0.4805 0.0000 1.0000 1019 
CEO business education 0.5209 0.4998 0.0000 1.0000 566 
MFI Control variables 
Regulation 0.2827 0.4561 0.0000 3.0000 1567 
MFI size 7.7488 1.6122 2.9089 12.8498 1537 
MFI age 9.2631 6.7452 0.0000 79.0000 1604 
Country control variable 
Human Deve. Index (HDI) 0.5627 0.1343 0.2390 0.7640 1573 
Competition 4.3943 1.5311 1.0000 7.0000 459 
Region control variables 
Latin America 0.2934 0.4554 0.0000 1.0000 3627 
Africa 0.2357 0.4245 0.0000 1.0000 3627 
Middle East 0.0372 0.1893 0.0000 1.0000 3627 
Eastern Europe 0.1830 0.3867 0.0000 1.0000 3627 
5.1 Descriptive evidence 
From the table 5-1; 63.87% of CEO has business experience; this is because the business 
experience includes attributes such as CEO ownership of business, management of the 
previous business prior to becoming the CEO and if the CEO is hired internally within the 
MFI. This is evidenced by the fact that most MFIs are started by an individual who has 
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entrepreneurial skills and or ideas to help poor people and, who eventually become CEO (e.g 
Valadez and Buskirk, 2011a, Yunus, 1999). There is 52.09% of CEO with business 
education. This is not surprising because the CEO education is considered as a university 
level undergraduate or graduate in business, banking, accounting, management, and 
economics and similar. It takes many years to acquire this formal business education. This 
implies that there are more CEOs with business experience than CEO with business 
education. 
The region control variables has the highest number of observations because there is 
no missing value and the number of cases from 74 countries were 403 of which were 
collected from 2001 to 2009 for 9 years (                 . There are few numbers of 
observations for percentages of women clients and competition because there are one to two 
years of records available which capture these variables. 
Tab 5-2 Correlations for dependent variables 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
(1)AROA 1 
    (2)PaR30 -0.2696
*
 1 
   (3)Average loan size -0.0775
*
 0.0021 1 
  (4)Percentage of women clients 0.1048 -0.0255 0.0407 1 
 (5)Credit clients 0.1162
*
 -0.0958
*
 -0.0527
*
 0.1991
*
 1 
*
indicates p < 0.05 
From table 5-2 above, the correlation between the return on assets and portfolio at risk is 
negative which means that better return on assets is related to fewer loans defaults and is 
significant at p<0.05 (at 5 percent significant level). The practice of clients paying the loan 
amount plus interest thereon ensures availability of loan to other clients. The average loan 
size is negatively related to return on assets and is significant at p<0.05 (at 5 percent 
significant level).  More credit clients are associated with profitability.  
5.2 Regression results and data analysis 
This section analyses the results from the regression output of the relationship between CEO 
formal business education and experience on financial and outreach performance. 
CEO characteristics and MFIs financial performance of return on assets and portfolio 
at risk (PaR30) are presented in table 5-3.  
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Tab 5-3 CEO characteristics and MFI Financial performance 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 AROA AROA PaR30 PaR30 
CEO=Bus. experience 0.106
*
 0.167
*
 -0.118
*
 -0.157
*
 
 (2.03) (2.18) (-2.16) (-2.33) 
CEO=Bus. education 0.0402 0.0111 0.00760 -0.00996 
 (0.99) (0.28) (0.38) (-0.46) 
MFI age  0.00168  0.00271
*
 
  (0.83)  (2.47) 
MFI size  0.0563
*
  -0.0382
**
 
  (2.37)  (-2.72) 
Competition  0.00438  0.000915 
  (0.50)  (0.19) 
Regulation  -0.0627
*
  0.0178 
  (-2.01)  (1.36) 
Human Dev. Index  -0.501
***
  0.373
***
 
  (-3.30)  (4.23) 
_cons 0.305
**
 0.423
**
 -0.118
***
 -0.107
***
 
 (2.69) (2.92) (-3.46) (-3.73) 
N 312 149 453 198 
Overall R-sq  0.0128 0.1011 0.0267 0.17 
Wald χ2 (2) 5.95 (11) 21.09       (2) 12.91        (11) 36.49 
Prob > chi2                                                  0.0510 0.0205 0.0016 0.0001 
z statistics in parentheses 
+
indicates p<0.10, *indicates p < 0.05, 
**
indicates p < 0.01, 
***
 indicates p < 0.001 
 
The data analysis of the output is based on the research question “Does MFIs with CEO with 
formal business education and business experience have better outreach and financial 
performance compared with MFIs with CEO without formal business education and business 
experience?” and the following hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1a: MFIs with CEO with formal business education have better financial 
performance compared with MFIs with CEO without formal business education. 
Hypothesis 2a: MFIs with CEO with business experience have better financial performance 
compared with MFIs with CEO without business experience. 
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From the table 5-3 page 36 (model 2 and 4 ) the coefficient of CEO with business experience 
on return on assets is positive, as expected, and on portfolio at risk for 30 days is negative, as 
expected, and all are statistically significant at p<0.05 (for 5 percent significant level). This 
confirms the second hypothesis (H2a) namely; MFIs with CEO with business experience 
have better financial performance compared with MFIs with CEO without business 
experience. This variable also has significant influence on return on assets t=2.18; Portfolio at 
risk for 30 days t=-2.33 which both are higher than t=1.96 (for 95 percent confidence 
level).The coefficient for CEO with formal business education (model 2 and 4) on return on 
assets is positive, as expected, and on portfolio at risk for 30 days is negative, as expected but 
all are statically not significant. This result does not support the first hypothesis (H1a) 
namely; MFIs with CEO with formal business education have better financial performance 
compared with MFIs with CEO without formal business education.  
CEO characteristics and MFIs outreach performance of average loan size, percentage 
of women clients and credit clients are presented in table 5-4. The analysis of the output is 
based on the research question “Does MFI with CEO with formal business education and 
business experience have better outreach and financial performance compared with MFIs 
with CEO without formal business education and business experience?” and the following 
hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1b: MFIs with CEO with formal business education are associated with more 
outreach performance compared with MFIs with CEO without formal business education. 
Hypothesis 2b: MFIs with CEO with business experience have more outreach performance 
compared with MFIs with CEO without business experience. 
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Tab 5-4 CEO characteristics and MFI outreach performance 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Average 
Loan 
size 
Average 
Loan size 
Percenta
ge of 
Women 
Clients 
Percentage 
of Women 
Clients 
Credit 
clients 
Credit  
clients 
CEO=Bus. experience -1.522
*
 -1.598
*
 0.161
**
 0.153
*
 1447.6
*
 1910.0
*
 
 (-2.25) (-2.52) (2.49) (2.28) (2.03) (-2.09) 
CEO=Bus. education -0.648 -0.873
*
 0.147
*
 0.161
*
 3693.7 1695.6
+
 
 (-1.67) (-2.22) (2.38) (2.48) (1.38) (1.65) 
MFI age  -0.00641  0.00035  136.9 
  (-0.36)  (0.08)  (1.02) 
MFI size  -0.284  -0.0109  5567.1
***
 
  (-1.70)  (-0.78)  (5.66) 
Competition  -0.0147  0.0139  -1798.7 
  (-0.22)  (0.93)  (-1.75) 
Regulation  0.120  -0.0140  -518.8 
  (1.25)  (-1.28)  (-0.78) 
Human Dev. Index  4.233
***
  1.097
***
  -29109.9
*
 
  (3.88)  (3.32)  (-2.05) 
_cons -2.922
**
 -3.598
**
 0.668
***
 0.124
**
 7564.6
***
 -50023.2
***
 
 (-3.25) (-4.52) (18.63) (10.52) (6.67) (-3.50) 
N 464 197 100 88 618 509 
Overall R-sq  0.0138 0.1276 0.0387 0.2099 0.0074 0.2644 
Wald χ2 (2) 12.02 (11)30.95 (2)6.24 (11) 29.89 (2) 32.56 (11) 40.07 
Prob > chi2                                                  0.0025 0.0006 0.0441 0.0017 0.0008 0.0003 
z statistics in parentheses 
+
indicates p<0.10, 
*
indicates p < 0.05, 
**
indicates p < 0.01, 
***
 indicates p < 0.001 
 
From table 5-4 above (model 2, 4 and 6) the coefficient for CEO with business experience on 
average loan size is negative, as expected, and on percentage of women clients is positive, as 
expected, and on credit clients is positive, as expected, and all are statistically significant at 
p<0.05 (for 5 percent significant level). These confirm the second hypothesis (H2b) namely; 
MFIs with CEO with business experience have better outreach than MFIs with CEO without 
business experience. This variable also has a strong influence on average loan size (t=-2.52); 
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percentage of women clients (t=2.28); and credit clients (t=-2.09) which both are higher than 
t=1.96 (for 95 percent confidence interval).  
The coefficient for CEO with formal business education (model 2, 4 and 6) on 
average loan size is negative, as expected, and on percentage of women clients is positive, as 
expected, and on credit clients is positive, as expected, and all are statistically significant at 
p<0.05 for average loan size and percentage of women clients; and p<0.1 for credit clients. 
These confirm the first hypothesis (H1b) namely; MFIs with CEO with formal business 
education have better outreach performance compared with MFIs with CEO without formal 
business education. This variable has pronounced influence on average loan size and 
percentage of women clients where the absolute value of t is higher than 1.96 (for 95 percent 
confidence level). 
5.3 Additional regression analyses and robustness checks 
I performed additional regression analysis to see if the outcomes of CEO characteristics on 
MFIs performance are influenced by CEO founder, given that empirical evidence shows that 
CEO founder are associated with better MFIs performance (Mersland. et al., 2011). Using 
random effect model (REM), I run a regression for  each of the dependent variables in 
financial and outreach performance as previously used with the option of “if CEO 
founder==0”. This means that CEO with formal business education and experience who are 
not founder of the MFI they manage. Lastly, I run regression analysis with Operating Self-
Sufficiency (OSS) and Write-off have as dependent variables in the model, in order to check 
the extent of influence of CEO formal business education and business experience. I also use 
the option of “if CEO is founder==0”  
I also tested for the existence of endogeneity in the relationship between CEO 
characteristics who are not founder, Operating self-sufficiency and write-off and MFIs 
performance. The results in table 5-5 next page show that endogeneity problem does not exist 
in these relationships.  
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Tab 5-5 additional regression and robustness checks testing for endogeneity results 
AROA If CEO founder==0 
Tests of endogeneity of:  
 
CEOBEDU CEOBEXP 
H0: Regressor is exogenous 
   Wu-Hausman F test: P-value 0.13364 0.35115 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-sq test: P-value 0.12461 0.33734 
PaR30 If CEO founder==0 
Tests of endogeneity of:  
 
CEOBEDU CEOBEXP 
H0: Regressor is exogenous 
   Wu-Hausman F test: P-value 0.25889 0.13269 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-sq test: P-value 0.24837 0.12533 
Average Loan size If CEO founder==0 
Tests of endogeneity of:  
 
CEOBEDU CEOBEXP 
H0: Regressor is exogenous 
   Wu-Hausman F test: P-value 0.87275 0.24701 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-sq test: P-value 0.87144 0.23655 
Percentage of Women clients If CEO founder==0 
Tests of endogeneity of:  
 
CEOBEDU CEOBEXP 
H0: Regressor is exogenous 
   Wu-Hausman F test: P-value 0.09865 0.6435 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-sq test: P-value 0.08641 0.62526 
Credit Clients If CEO founder==0 
Tests of endogeneity of:  
 
CEOBEDU CEOBEXP 
H0: Regressor is exogenous 
   Wu-Hausman F test: P-value 0.19715 0.84215 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-sq test: P-value 0.19155 0.83974 
Operating Self-Sufficiency 
   Tests of endogeneity of:  
 
CEOBEDU CEOBEXP 
H0: Regressor is exogenous 
   Wu-Hausman F test: P-value 0.33874 0.99111 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-sq test: P-value 0.32605 0.99085 
Operating Self-Sufficiency If CEO founder==0 
Tests of endogeneity of:  
 
CEOBEDU CEOBEXP 
H0: Regressor is exogenous 
   Wu-Hausman F test: P-value 0.0733 0.90675 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-sq test: P-value 0.06568 0.90263 
Write-off 
   Tests of endogeneity of:  
 
CEOBEDU CEOBEXP 
H0: Regressor is exogenous 
   Wu-Hausman F test: P-value 0.13076 0.67756 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-sq test: P-value 0.12569 0.67219 
Write-off If CEO founder==0 
Tests of endogeneity of:  
 
CEOBEDU CEOBEXP 
H0: Regressor is exogenous 
   Wu-Hausman F test: P-value 0.4531 0.50478 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-sq test: P-value 0.44168 0.49384 
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Table 5-6 below report CEO characteristics and MFIs return on assets and portfolio at risk for 
30 days when CEO is not founder. The results show that there is a positive and statically 
significant p<0.05 (at 5 percent significant level), as expected, coefficient for CEO business 
experience on return on assets; negative and statistically significant p<0.05 (at 5 percent 
significant level), as expected, on portfolio at risk for 30 days. The coefficient of CEO formal 
business education is not significant, as expected, in both return on assets and portfolio at risk 
for 30 days.  
Table 5-7 report CEO characteristics and MFIs outreach when CEO is not founder. 
The results shows that there is a positive and statistically significant p<0.05 (at 5 percent 
significant level), as expected, coefficient of CEO business experience on percentage of 
women clients and credit clients. 
Tab 5-6 CEO characteristics and MFI financial performance without CEO founder 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 AROA AROA PaR30 PaR30 
CEO=Bus. experience 0.0514
+
 0.0374
*
 -0.048
*
 -0.0366
*
 
 (1.91) (2.20) (-1.98) (-2.26) 
CEO=Bus. education -0.0037 -0.00098 0.0005 0.0110 
 (-0.28) (-0.07) (0.03) (0.69) 
MFI age  0.000148  0.00128 
  (0.15)  (1.22) 
MFI size  0.0262
*
  0.00857
*
 
  (4.15)  (2.11) 
Competition  0.00255  0.00360 
  (0.60)  (0.72) 
Regulation  -0.0376
*
  0.00901 
  (-2.31)  (0.79) 
Human Dev. Index  -0.167
*
  -0.0809 
  (-2.08)  (-1.06) 
_cons 0.0396
*
 0.260
**
 -0.230
**
 -0.227
***
 
 (2.36) (2.81) (-2.58) (-3.37) 
N 600 507 592 559 
Overall R-sq  0.0192 0.1178 0.0539 0.0785 
Wald χ2 (2)10.95 (11) 43.09 (2)21.54 (11) 35.75 
Prob > chi2                                                  0.0042 0.0053 0.0001 0.0003 
z statistics in parentheses 
+
indicates p<0.10, *indicates p < 0.05, 
**
indicates p < 0.01, 
***
 indicates p < 0.001 
 
42 
 
The coefficient for CEO business experience on average loan size is negative, as expected, 
and statistically significant p<0.05 (at 5 percent significant level).  
 The coefficient for CEO with formal business education is positive and statistically 
significant p<0.05 (at 5 significant level), as expected, on percentage of women clients, and is 
positive and statistically significant p<0.1 (at 10 percent significant level), as expected, on 
credit clients. The coefficient of CEO formal business education on average loan size is 
negative, as expected, and statistically significant p<0.05 (at 5 percent significant level). 
Tab 5-7 CEO characteristics and MFI Outreach performance without CEO founder 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Average 
Loan 
size 
Average 
Loan 
size 
Percentage 
of Women 
Clients 
Percentage 
of Women 
Clients 
Credit 
clients 
Credit  
clients 
CEOBEXP -1.167
*
 -1.374
*
 0.0731
*
 0.0669
*
 10341.5
*
 1180.5
*
 
 (-2.13) (-2.24) (2.31) (2.19) (1.98) (2.04) 
CEOBEDU -0.576 -0.784
*
 0.119
*
 0.1497
*
 3563.5 1676.0
+
 
 (-1.41) (-2.03) (2.11) (2.36) (1.22) (1.67) 
MFI age  -0.0088  -0.00364  69.49 
  (-0.48)  (-0.67)  (0.38) 
MFI size  -0.0359  0.0250  7190.5
***
 
  (-0.32)  (1.20)  (8.08) 
Competition  0.135  -0.0146  -1068.4 
  (1.55)  (-0.67)  (-1.24) 
Regulation  -0.162  -0.0218  -1074.8 
  (-0.57)  (-0.24)  (-0.48) 
Human Dev. Index  -0.178  1.466
***
  -23514.2 
  (-0.13)  (3.79)  (-1.60) 
_cons 0.1456
**
 -0.2504
**
 0.665
***
 -0.783
***
 -6050.9
**
 -76490.4
***
 
 (2.49) (-3.03) (5.15) (-6.84) (-3.32) (-5.22) 
N 258 242 54 47 259 243 
Overall R-sq  0.0129 0.0493 0.0187 0.1554 0.0044 0.1635 
Wald χ2 (2) 9.77 (11)28.8
9 
(2) 4.24 (11) 24.78 (2) 27.00 (11)29.49 
Prob > chi2                                                  0.0016 0.0003 0.0243 0.0058 0.0000 0.0000 
z statistics in parentheses 
+
indicates p<0.10, 
*
indicates p < 0.05, 
**
indicates p < 0.01, 
***
 indicates p < 0.001 
From the robust regression in table 5-6 and 5-7, I conclude that I find no effect when the 
CEO fonder is not included as CEO with business experience and formal business, hence the 
report results are robust. 
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To run the additional regression analysis for operating self-sufficiency and write-off, this 
study checked whether they models that are used obey the assumptions of multiple regression 
analysis. The operating self-sufficiency and write-off variables were normally distributed.  
I tested for heteroscedasticity using Breusch-Pagan test. Table 5-8 below shows the 
results. The test results for determinants of operating self-sufficiency (OSS) were not 
statistically significant (p>0.05 for 5 percent significant level), hence I failed to reject the null 
hypothesis. The test results for determinants of write off is statistically significant (p<0.05 for 
5 percent significant level), which implies that there is unequal variance. Therefore, this 
model was run with constant error as suggested by econometrics literature (Verbeek, 2012, 
Studenmund, 2006, Greene, 2012). 
Tab 5-8 additional regression Breusch-Pagan test for heteroscedasticity 
 
Determinants of write-off 
 
 
I tested autocorrelation using Wooldridge test. Table 5-9 next page shows the results. The 
results for determinants of write off were not significant (p>0.05 for 5 percent significant 
level), hence I failed to reject the null hypothesis. The result for determinants of operating 
self-sufficiency was statistically significant (p<0.05 for 5 percent significant level), hence I 
rejected the null hypothesis, apparently, the model was run with standard error as suggested 
in econometrics literature (Gujarati and Porter, 2010, Stock and Watson, 2003). 
 
 
 
 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.4790
         chi2(1)      =     0.50
         Variables: fitted values of OSS
         Ho: Constant variance
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
. hettest
         Prob > chi2  =   0.0000
         chi2(1)      =   157.06
         Variables: fitted values of write_off
         Ho: Constant variance
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
. hettest
44 
 
Tab 5-9 Wooldridge test for Autocorrelation results 
Determinants of operating self-sufficiency (OSS) 
 
Determinants of write off 
 
 
I also run Hausman test to decide the model for use. Table 5-10 next page shows the results. 
All test results were statistically not significant (p>0.05 for 5 percent significant level); hence 
I failed to reject the null hypothesis. Following these results, I used random effect model to in 
the regression analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
           Prob > F =      0.0007
    F(  1,      75) =     12.465
H0: no first order autocorrelation
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data
. xtserial OSS CEOBEXP CEOBEDU `controls'
           Prob > F =      0.0765
    F(  1,     118) =      3.193
H0: no first order autocorrelation
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data
. xtserial write_off CEOBEXP CEOBEDU `controls'
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Tab 5-10 additional regression Hausman test results 
Determinants of operating self-sufficiency  
 
Determinants of write-off 
 
 
Table 5-11 next page shows robust regression results for CEO characteristics and MFIs 
operational self-sufficiency (OSS) when the CEO is founder and when the CEO not founder. 
From the table, CEO business experience coefficient is positive and statistically significant 
p<0.05 (at 5 percent significant level) in both case when the CEO is founder and not founder. 
The coefficient for CEO with formal business education is not significant in both case, when 
the CEO is founder and when the CEO is not founder. 
Table 5-12 page 47 shows robust regression results for CEO characteristics and MFIs 
write-off when the CEO is fonder and when not founder. The coefficient for CEO with 
business experience in both case is negative, and statistically significant p<0.05 (at 5 percent 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.5072
                          =        3.31
                  chi2(4) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
     MFIsize     -1.158702     .2122747       -1.370976         1.08068
      MFIage      .3444186    -.0113806        .3557993        .2242918
         hdi       .166146     .0061652        .1599808        14.87311
 Competition     -.3521799    -.0049933       -.3471866         .249044
                                                                              
                     fe           re         Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
. hausman fe re
                Prob>chi2 =      0.3168
                          =        5.89
                  chi2(5) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
     MFIsize      .0214028    -.0061793        .0275821        .0166707
      MFIage     -.0052218     .0002503       -.0054721         .002527
         hdi     -.0645513      .062998       -.1275493        .4700812
  Regulation        .00125    -.0017047        .0029547        .0045331
 Competition      .0001789    -.0026148        .0027936        .0062354
                                                                              
                     fe           re         Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
. hausman fe re
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significant level). The results for CEO with formal business education are somehow 
appealing.  
Tab 5-11 CEO characteristics and operational self-sufficiency 
 With CEO founder Without CEO founder 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OSS OSS OSS OSS 
CEOBEXP 0.0415 0.0779
*
 0.0316 0.06117
*
 
 (1.14) (2.12) (1.01) (2.01) 
CEOBEDU 0.0569 -0.0229 -0.0302 -0.0874 
 (0.75) (-0.29) (-0.21) (-0.67) 
MFI age  -0.00638  -0.00895 
  (-1.36)  (-1.70) 
MFI size  0.0902
***
  0.143
***
 
  (4.15)  (4.85) 
Competition  0.00741  0.0149 
  (0.34)  (0.60) 
Regulation  -0.104  -0.238
**
 
  (-1.28)  (-2.65) 
Human Dev. Index  0.650  0.402 
  (1.32)  (0.67) 
_cons 1.087
***
 1.543
**
 1.071
**
 -1.334
**
 
 (4.31) (5.29) (3.55) (-4.72) 
N 368 341 170 159 
Overall R-sq  0.0031 0.1004 0.0067 0.2354 
Wald χ2 (2) 5.21 (11)31.41  (2)18.32 (11)36.61 
Prob > chi2                                                  0.048 0.0009 0.0051 0.0001 
z statistics in parentheses 
+
indicates p<0.10, *indicates p < 0.05, 
**
indicates p < 0.01, 
***
 indicates p < 0.001 
When the CEO founder is grouped with the CEO characteristics, the coefficient is negative 
and not significant, but when the CEO founder is not included, the coefficient is positive and 
statistically significant p<0.05 (at 5 percent significant level). 
I found significant results (p<0.05 at 5 percent significant level) from the robust 
regression results in table 5-11 and 5-12 on CEO characteristics, MFIs operational self-
sufficiency and write-off when the CEO is founder grouped in CEO characteristics and when 
excluded. CEO business experience is associated with covering their cost of operation 
through revenue. The results are significant in both cases when the CEO founder grouped in 
CEO characteristics and when excluded. This is consistent with the result I obtained when I 
used the return on assets. The results also show that CEO with business experience is 
associated with few write-offs of loan. This is same in both cases when the CEO founder is 
grouped in CEO characteristics and when excluded. 
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Tab 5-12 CEO characteristics and the write-off 
 With CEO founder Without CEO founder 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Write-off Write-off Write-off Write-off 
CEOBEXP -0.00409 -0.00801
*
 -0.00505 -0.00619
*
 
 (-1.10) (-2.00) (-1.35) (-1.98) 
CEOBEDU -0.00527 -0.00352 0.0161
*
 0.0166
*
 
 (-1.07) (-1.26) (2.86) (3.30) 
MFI age  0.000169  0.000293 
  (0.70)  (0.88) 
MFI size  -0.00308
*
  -0.00448
*
 
  (-2.21)  (-2.05) 
Competition  -0.000978  -0.00262 
  (-0.87)  (-1.63) 
Regulation  0.00247  0.00363 
  (0.65)  (0.67) 
Human Dev. Index  0.0417  0.0144 
  (1.72)  (0.38) 
_cons 0.0217
***
 0.1420
***
 0.03721
***
 0.0742
****
 
 (7.23) (8.74) (6.75) (7.01) 
N 576 557 245 234 
Overall R-sq  0.0161 0.1543 0.0170 0.0866 
Wald χ2 (2)36.72 (11)30.83 (2)41.89 (11)39.99 
Prob > chi2                                                  0.0013 0.0000 0.000 0.000 
z statistics in parentheses 
+
indicates p<0.10, *indicates p < 0.05, 
**
indicates p < 0.01, 
***
 indicates p < 0.001 
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CHAPTER SIX: DISCUSSION, CONCLUSION, IMPLICATIONS, AREAS FOR 
FUTURE STUDIES AND LIMITATIONS 
This section discusses the results from the data analysis in chapter five. The discussion covers 
theoretical policy and managerial implications of the findings, future areas of study and 
limitations of the study.  
6.1 Discussion 
Most of the existing literature on CEO characteristics and firm performance are in the context 
of limited liabilities companies which focuses on profit motives only (e.g. Barker and 
Mueller, 2002, Rajagopalan and Datta, 1996, Harjoto and Jo, 2009, Nelson, 2005, Manner, 
2010, Bigley and Wiersema, 2002a, Bhagat et al., 2010a, Gottesman and Morey, 2010, 
Gottesman and Morey, 2006, Jalbert et al., 2011). A critical question is that, is there 
significant results to support the fact that MFIs with CEO with formal business education and 
business experience have better performance compared to MFI with CEO without these 
characteristics?  
 
Drawing from resource based view theory and upper echelons theory (Slater and 
Dixon-Fowler, 2009, Kunc and Morecroft, 2010, Roth, 1995); I have argued that, CEO is 
unique, resourceful personnel having managerial characteristics of formal business education 
and business experience. The interactions of these managerial characteristics with strategic 
decision making process  enable the MFIs they manage to have better financial and outreach 
performance  compared to MFIs with CEO without these managerial characteristics (Stuart, 
2011). The results support this argument for MFIs with CEO with business experience and 
partly support the argument for MFIs with CEO with formal business education. 
 
The positive and significant results coefficient of CEO with business experience on 
return on assets; credit clients and percentage of women clients are vital. This is because 
MFIs with CEO with business experience are more profitable; associated with credit clients 
growth and serves more women clients who have an exemplary record of paying their loan 
(D’Espallier et al., 2011, McCarter, 2006) than MFIs which their CEO does not have business 
experience.  
 
The negative and significant results (at p<0.05 for 5 percent significant level) 
coefficient of CEO with business experience on average loan size, and portfolio at risk for 30 
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days imply that MFI with CEO with business experience provide smaller loan and their 
clients have fewer default of outstanding loan for 30 days. The smaller loan is the reflection 
of  reaching more poor clients (Galema and Lensink, 2011, Armendariz and Labie, 2011), 
and timely repayment rate of loan is consistent with the focus on women clients, which has 
fewer defaults. The use of average loan size, percentage of women clients and credit clients 
measures of outreach are also, recently used in the MFIs literature (Mersland et al., 2011, 
Mersland and Strøm, 2009a, Hartarska and Mersland, 2009, Galema and Lensink, 2011).  
 
Therefore, MFIs with CEO with business experience, reach more clients, have fewer 
defaults and are profitable compared with MFIs with CEO without business experience 
(Hartarska, 2005, Stuart and Abetti, 1990, Stuart, 2011, Sow Hup, 2010). There is anecdotal 
evidence to support this argument that profitability with a focus on clients is a core to success 
of many MFIs business model (DiLeo., 2012, Ayayi and Sene, 2010). 
 
The statistical insignificance coefficient of CEO with formal business education on 
return on assets and portfolio at risk for 30 days, means, that MFIs with CEO with formal 
business education profitability and rate of defaults does not perform differently from those 
MFIs which their CEO without formal business education (e. g. University degree in 
engineering and law). There is empirical support to this results in the international business 
research, where CEO with formal business education does not perform differently from those 
CEO with other discipline of education
4
 (Gottesman and Morey, 2010, Gottesman and 
Morey, 2006, Jalbert et al., 2011, Martelli and Abels, 2010, Dreher and Ryan, 2001). Other 
studies  (e.g. Bhagat et al., 2010a) show that formal business education brings short term 
improvement in financial performance, but the relationship is not significant in the long term 
financial performance. 
 
The positive statistical significant results coefficient of CEO with formal business 
education on percentage of women clients (p<0.05 at 5 percent significant level); and on 
credit clients (p<0.1 at 10 percent significant level) is vital. This is because, MFIs with CEO 
with formal business education serves more female clients and have better credit clients’ 
growth compared to MFIs with CEO without formal business education. This implies that 
CEO with formal business education fosters outreach through reaching more credit clients 
                                                 
4
 For example CEO with University degree in Engineering and law 
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who are women and who has a solid history of repaying their loan (D’Espallier et al., 2011, 
Chowdhury and Chowdhury, 2011, Krishnan, 2011, McCarter, 2006).  
 
The negative statistical significant (p<0.05 at 5 percent significant level) coefficient of 
CEO with formal business education on average loan size implies that MFIs with CEO with 
formal business education provide small loan size.  
 
An interesting question to this result is why these CEO with formal business 
education provides smaller loan. While they know that small loan has higher transaction costs 
(Armendariz and Labie, 2011, Galema and Lensink, 2011, Mersland and Strøm, 2010). I 
could argue that these higher transaction costs compensated using higher interest rate to cover 
all the costs (Cull et al., 2011, Garmaise and Natividad, 2010, Rosengard, 2011). With higher 
interest rate, they could serve more credit clients as the findings of this study indicated and, 
that they serve more credit clients, but also with more women clients. However, this need to 
be interpreted with precautions because, sometimes higher interest rates lead into a higher 
rate of defaults (see CGAP, 2010).  
 
A critical, empirical question without guiding theory is that, does the CEO with 
formal business education still choose to offer smaller loan size given these consequences? 
The argument could be yes! However, anecdotal evidence in MFIs argues that CEOs in MFIs 
are aware of the issue of mission drift (Stuart, 2011), which makes them, more concerned 
with creating public value that is directly advantageous to clients and legally accepted.  
6.2 Conclusion 
The growing concern among MFIs practitioners and other stakeholder in the microfinance 
industry is that of short supply of CEOs with managerial experiences in finance, banking and 
accounting, or technical expertise and professionalism (Mendelson, 2011, Lascelles et al., 
2011). Regardless of this concern, there are limited empirical evidence to whether MFIs with 
CEO with formal business education and business experience have better performance than 
MFIs with CEO without formal business education and business experience (Sow Hup, 
2010).  
This study was able to add knowledge  on the issue using data from 403 rated MFIs in 
74 countries for the period of 9 years from 2001 to 2009, by providing both descriptive and 
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econometric evidence from panel data estimation using random effect model (REM) on the 
influence of CEO with formal business education and experience on MFIs performance.  
 
The conclusions are that, the MFIs with CEO with business experience have better 
financial and outreach performance compared with the MFIs with CEO without business 
experience. MFIs with CEO with formal business education have better outreach compared to 
MFIs with CEO without formal business education, while the study find that the financial 
performance of MFIs with CEO with formal business education does not differ significantly 
with those of MFIs with CEO without formal business education.    These results were 
consistent even after running robustness check and additional regression analysis.  
6.3 Theoretical, policy and managerial implications 
The findings of this study on two of the managerial characteristics of the CEOs in MFIs are 
applicable in many different ways, mainly with respect to understanding the influence of 
CEOs with formal business education and experience in MFIs performance broadly. The 
better financial and outreach performance of MFIs with CEO with business experience 
compared to those MFIs with CEO without business experience highlights the need and 
importance of this managerial characteristic for a better future of the microfinance industry as 
also addressed in the microfinance banana skin 2011 (Lascelles et al., 2011).  
 
Even though, the results show no difference in terms of return on assets and portfolio 
at risk for 30 days between MFIs with CEO with formal business education and those MFIs 
with CEO without such characteristics, empirical studies uphold the importance of formal 
business education for CEOs (see Hansen et al., 2010).  This is further empirically confirmed 
by the results of this study, where MFIs with CEO with formal business education has better 
outreach compared to MFIs with CEO without formal business education.  
 
The flaw associated with practical applications of formal business education in MFIs 
is unavoidable because most program in business education concentrate much on 
quantitative-based analytical skills rather than developing leadership and interpersonal skills 
that are necessary for success in high level of managerial cadre (Gottesman and Morey, 
2010). I, therefore, suggest that apart from training on quantitative-based analytical skill, 
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business school should focus also on developing
5
 leadership and interpersonal skill that could 
help those who aspire for higher managerial cadre.  
 
Moreover, the labor market for CEO in MFIs is thin, and there are few qualified 
CEOs (Mersland and Strøm, 2010, Mendelson, 2011, Lascelles et al., 2011). This could be 
due to the limited external forces to shape the CEO labor markets in MFIs, for example, due 
to differing ownership, as most MFI does not have true owners as compared to for profit only 
limited liability companies (Hartarska, 2005). I suggest those MFIs practitioners and other 
stakeholder like academician needs to pay attention to the way the labor market for CEOs in 
MFIs can be expanded. One issue that remain not well researched is that of compensation of 
CEOs in the microfinance industry. For example, unresolved CEOs compensations may not 
attract well qualified CEOs to work in the microfinance industry, or there could be 
nonalignment of interest of CEOs and owners in MFIs, hence poor performance (Ozkan, 
2011, Krause, 2009, Walker and Kramer, 2011). 
 
To the microfinance industry, the consistence of the regression results after running 
without the CEO founder implies that MFIs performance do better with CEOs with business 
experience who is non-founder. This implies that, in the future, the microfinance industry can 
benefit with CEO business experience from non-microfinance industry.   
6.4  Areas for future studies 
This study used only two of the CEO characteristics from the upper echelon theory; I propose 
future studies to include more variables of the CEO characteristic like CEO tenure in MFI, 
functional background and CEO age. The upper echelon theory proposes two moderating 
effect of managerial discretion and executive job demands (Hambrick, 2007). I propose that 
future studies could include one of these moderating effects. Also, future study can looks into 
the relationship between CEO and top management team size influence on MFIs 
performance. 
6.5 Limitations of the study 
The results in this study are subject to limitations. Use of secondary data renders data 
limitations. The data set used comprises of only rated MFIs which makes these data not to be 
                                                 
5
 For example “Internationalization Laboratory” a known program to author for MBA students at University of 
Agder which “Provide an in-depth understanding of Strategy and International Management, and use this 
knowledge in a real-life business case” (for further information see www.uia.no).  
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representatives of all MFIs population. The data do not include such smaller MFIs which the 
five rating agencies does not, and large MFIs, which the regular banking agencies asses them. 
Also, the MFIs used in this study were only once rated during the sample period by rating 
agencies, and, therefore, the CEO characteristics do not vary over time, and I could not 
measure the effects of change of CEO characteristics over time.  
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